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RIPENESS AND REVIEWABLE ORDERS 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Louis L. Jaffe* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE requirement of "ripeness" as a condition for judicial review is not so much a definable doctrine as a compendious port-
manteau, a group of related doctrines arising in diverse but ana-
logically similar situations. In its most general sense ripeness is 
a requirement not of the administrative action to be reviewed but 
of the judicial controversy between the plaintiff and the agency. 
Consider the case where an agency has gone no further than to 
threaten a certain action which the plaintiff in an equity or de-
claratory proceeding claims would be contrary to law: here, in all 
strictness, the controversy concerns not the legality of an admin-
istrative action but the construction of a statute or of the Con-
stitution.1 Whether such cases are "ripe" for judicial intervention 
may involve not only the proper relation of agency and court but 
the existence of a controversy suitable for judicial determination. 
On the other hand, an agency may have taken definitive action; 
it may have, for example, promulgated a regulation or issued a 
complaint, served a subpoena or denied intervention. Whether 
these actions can be tested forthwith raises questions which are 
sometimes discussed under the rubric "ripeness," sometimes "ex-
haustion of remedies,"2 sometimes "standing." Discussion under 
any of these rubrics may suffice, but in certain cases the issue is 
faced more squarely under one than under another. In the fa-
mous Columbia Broadcasting System3 case, I would say that the 
question was primarily one of "standing," since there were no 
administrative remedies available to the plaintiff; it was at least 
possible, though not likely, that those who could pursue such 
remedies might never invoke them. In short, the question was 
• Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.-Ed. 
1 Cf. Frankfurter, J., in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), 
referring to United States v. Los Angeles 8: S.L.R.R., 273 U.S. 299 (1927): "Plainly the 
denial of judicial review in these cases does not derive from a regard for the special 
functions of administrative agencies. Judicial abstention here is merely an application 
of the traditional criteria for bringing judicial action into play." 307 U.S. at 131. 
2 See Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 327 
(1963). 
3 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), discussed 
infra. Similar is a case such as Farmer v. United Elec. Union, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 
1954), in which the plaintiff union might never be able to appeal. 
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not so much whether the controversy was "ripe" but whether 
there was or at any time would be a justiciable controversy be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant. 
One must also distinguish cases which involve orders which 
are as "mature" as they are ever going to be; in that circumstance 
the issue is whether the action is reviewable at all. Such a case is 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.4 The func-
tion of the agency there was formally to designate organizations 
as "communist." This finding, it is true, might serve later as a 
predicate for further action against members of the organization, 
but as far as the organization was concerned the administrative 
process has reached its terminal point. Did an organization for-
mally classified by the Government as communist, given the enor-
mous defamatory consequences of the action, have a sufficient 
interest to secure review? The affirmative answer given did not 
go to the timeliness of review but to its availability vel non. On 
the other hand, the so-called "directive orders" of the National 
War Labor Board providing for an increase in wages were held 
not reviewable because, as the Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia put it, the order was "directive" rather than "manda-
tory." This interpretation was based on congressional intent: 
Congress had rejected proposals to make the Board's orders en-
forceable and reviewable.5 Another case which might engage our 
attention at this point is Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners 
Gonference,6 a class suit by the AP A section 11 trial examiners 
attacking as invalid under section 11 the Civil Service Commission 
regulations governing the classification, salary, assignment, promo-
tion and lay-off of trial examiners. Part of the difficulty was that, 
although these regulations were a prelude to a whole system of 
future applications, in a considerable number of these applications 
the affected individual would be unable to trace his predicament 
precisely to the regulations. It is this kind of situation, for exam-
ple, which has led some states to allow public actions to test the 
validity of civil service regulations.7 There is, in short, a latent 
or concealed "standing" question. Although the trial court di-
4 341 U.S. 123 (1951). 
5 Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v. National War Labor Bd., 
143 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944); accord, National War Labor 
Bd. v. Montgomery Ward &: Co., 144 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 
(1944). 
6 344 U.S. 853 (1952). 
7 See Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review, 74 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1265, 1299 (1961). 
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rected itself to the standing question,8 it was not thereafter raised 
by any of the parties and was not considered in the opinions of 
either the court of appeals or the Supreme Court. The case does 
illustrate, however, what will be the underlying thesis of this 
article: ripeness should not be determined by formula but by a 
reasoned balancing of certain typical and relevant factors for and 
against the assumption of jurisdiction. 
The development and expression of ripeness concepts has 
become to some extent entangled with the definition of a "review-
able order." A statute may provide in particular situations for 
review of an "order" or a "final order"; such review is to be had 
in a named court pursuant to a specified procedure. The three 
or four most discussed "ripeness" cases involved the question 
whether the administrative action was an "order" under such a 
statu~e. Finally, an inquiry such as this, one primarily into the 
ripeness concept in administrative law, has become embroiled, 
obfuscated and distorted by the acute involvement of ripeness 
doctrines in constitutional adjudication. 
The requirement that there be a "controversy" is applicable 
generally to the exercise of the judicial function. But the criteria 
for determining the existence of a controversy are flexible; the 
judgments are thus ones of degree and balance. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, a judge who is among those who have most insisted on the 
requirement of justiciability, has said, "Whether 'justiciability' 
exists . . . has most often turned on evaluating both the appro-
priateness of the issues for decision by courts and the hardship of 
denying judicial relief."9 This flexibility, whatever particular 
judges and lawyers may think of the tactic, 10 permits courts to 
insist more on the ripeness requirement in constitutional than in 
other cases. It will, of course, be resorted to by judges who are 
wary of exercising a court's power to adjudicate constitutional 
issues. Because the Supreme Court is so predominantly concerned 
with constitutional law, restrictive notions of ripeness are "in the 
air" and have sometimes been applied inappropriately to ad-
ministrative law questions, and also to other areas.11 State courts, 
8 104 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1952). 
9 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951). 
10 See Douglas, J., protesting against the use of "ripeness" requirements to avoid 
constitutional adjudications, in Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. lll 
(1962): "The approach we take today has often been used to abdicate the judicial 
function under resounding utterances concerning the importance of judicial self-
denial." Id. at 117. 
11 One is entitled to view the very restrictive attitudes of Mr. Justice Brandeis 
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less badgered by the pressure of constitutional issues, are some-
times less doctrinaire about ripeness. In recent years, however, 
ripeness requirements have been relaxed in the administrative law 
field, in part because of a relaxation in the constitutional law field, 
in part because the distinction between the two fields has come to 
be felt if not always expressed. I suggest, therefore, that constitu-
tional law cases be put more or less to the side12 (though they 
need not be completely ignored) in constructing ripeness require-
ments in administrative law-the requirements, that is, in cases 
of judicial review of the legality of administrative action and con-
troversies between citizen and agency concerning the construction 
of statutes. 
Il. THE FOUNDATION CASES ON RIPENESS 
A handful of cases arising under the review provision of the 
so-called Urgent Deficiencies Act13 and its derivatives have done 
most to develop and shape the current concept of ripeness. The 
derivative of that act provides that ". . . the district courts shall 
have jurisdiction of any civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside. 
annul or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission."14 Because this provision does not define 
"order" and because the language of equity is used, the courts 
have been apt to fall back on general principles of justiciability in 
defining the requirements of reviewability under this statute. To 
be sure, the requirement that there be an "order," i.e., that the 
agency's action has been in some degree formal, may exclude 
concerning justiciability, particularly his aspersions on the constitutionality of the 
declaratory judgment technique in general, as proceeding from his fear that relaxed 
notions of justiciability would increase immeasurably the reach of the Supreme Court 
in constitutional issues. See, e.g., Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 2i4 
(1928). The Rickover case is an excellent example of the juxtaposition in citation and 
discussion of ripeness cases from all areas, and of the hopes and fears aroused by the 
practice. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, supra note 10. 
12 Special considerations are also at work in cases involving state-federal relationships. 
This is an area which the Supreme Court may hesitate to enter before the processes 
of state law have worked out what may be a modus vivendi to accommodate a potential 
jurisdictional clash. See, e.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. United Air Lines, 346 U.S. 402 
(1953); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952). But despite the possibility 
of state-federal conflict, in cases where the exclusive character of the federal jurisdiction 
seems clear to the Court it may take jurisdiction where it would otherwise wait. E.g., 
Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943). This is only to say that in 
such situations there is a special dimension not present in the usual administrative 
law case. See Jaffe, supra note 2, at 339. 
13 38 Stat. 219 (1913). This procedure and related provisions are now codified in 
28 u.s.c §§ 1253, 1336, 2284, 2321-25 (1958). 
14 28 u.s.c. § 1336 (1958). 
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from the statute some controversies which are within other heads 
of jurisdiction, be it the general "equity" jurisdiction or the 
mandamus jurisdiction. But in the earliest of our brace of cases, 
United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R.,15 the same considerations 
which were held to exclude review of the Commission's action as 
an "order" were held to exclude relief under "the general equity 
powers." This decision is one which in the light of subsequent 
developments must be considered more carefully than is some-
times now the case. Its pronouncements, taken I would suggest out 
of context, have occasionally been misused by some judges. Fur-
thermore, if it be thought that Mr. Justice Brandeis overformu-
lated the requirements of ripeness in the Los Angeles R.R. case, 
it does not follow that the decision was wrong or that it would not 
still be followed today. 
In Los Angeles a railroad company sought review of the "final 
value" of its property determined by the ICC under the Valua-
tion Act. It alleged that the valuation was ultra vires the act and 
contrary to the due process clause. It contended that the valuation 
was an "order," and, if not an "order," that it was reviewable 
under the equity jurisdiction because the valuation would impair 
its credit. Under the 1913 Valuation Act the Commission was "to 
investigate, ascertain, and report the value of all the property 
owned or used by every common carrier subject to" the Interstate 
Commerce Act.16 Many reasons for such a valuation were urged in 
the congressional debates but none were stated in the act. The 
valuation would be prima fade evidence "in all proceedings under 
the Act,"17 but no particular proceeding was specified. In ad-
ministering the valuation project, the Commission adopted valua-
tion theories which it regarded as relevant to rate making. But 
even then railroad rate making had little relation to the capital 
account. Rates were based not on the total investment but on the 
immediate costs of shipment and on competitive conditions sur-
rounding the carriage of particular commodities and classes of 
commodities. By 1933, rate making was formally divorced from 
the capital account. The valuations, therefore,-and Mr. Justice 
Brandeis estimated that there were 1800 railroads involved-
were more or less theoretical constructions of the capital account 
quite without immediate relevance to or impact on any of the 
Commission's regulatory functions. The enormously complex and 
115 273 U.S. 299 (1927). 
10 37 Stat. 701, 49 U.S.C. § 19(a) (1958). 
11 37 Stat. 703 (1913), 49 U.S.C. § 19(i) (1958). 
1278 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
controversial attempts of the Supreme Court to establish and to 
administer concepts governing the so-called "rate base" (the capital 
account) in cases in which the rate base was one of the factors in 
an actual rate determination are quite familiar. Even in such cases 
the rate base was, together with operating costs and prospective in-
come, but one of the factors in the equation.18 And a rate base 
was no sooner determined than changed circumstances required 
its correction. The whole valuation project involved the Com-
mission in decades of work which came to nought. Its objectives 
were never clear and, in any case, the theories and assumptions on 
which it was based became obsolete before it was put to any use.19 
It would be difficult to find in the books an occasion for judicial 
review more inappropriate and futile. 
But this does not end our consideration of the case. In his 
opinion Mr. Justice Brandeis said the following: 
"The so-called order here complained of is one which 
does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing, 
any thing; which does not grant or withhold any authority, 
privilege or license; which does not extend or abridge any 
power or facility; ... which does not change the carrier's ex-
isting or future status or condition; which does not determine 
any right or obligation."20 
In the first place, it must be remembered that this formulation 
is directed to the contention that the valuation is an "order." Not 
every administrative action having practical or potential legal con-
sequences is an order. The formulation, therefore, is not meant 
to exclude the possibility of equity jurisdiction. Brandeis was 
surely as familiar as any judge with the bill in equity to enjoin 
the threatened enforcement of a statute where the remedy at law 
was conceived to be inadequate. However, if the statement was 
meant to be a complete and exclusive definition of the kind of 
actions which are reviewable as "orders," it is no longer accurate, 
18 Cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), where the FPC had made 
findings as to the lawfulness of past rates "in aid of state regulation." "They are only 
a preliminary, interim step towards possible future action-action not by the Com-
mission but by wholly independent agencies. The outcome of those proceedings may 
tum on factors other than these findings." Id. at 619, with the Court citing Los Angeles. 
19 Professor Sharfman, the historian of the Commission, said, in 1935 [3-A SHARFMAN, 
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 319 (1935)], that "the present status of the project 
constitutes in itself a monument to the Commission's genius for accomplishment." If 
this is meant to suggest that the "accomplishment" was useful, I can find nothing to 
support the conclusion in Professor Sharfman's chapter on "The Valuation Project." 
My characterization of the project is based on § 2 of this chapter of his book. 
20 273 U.S. at 309-10. 
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at least if its formulations are given the meanings that would 
normally be put on them. I would hazard the opinion, however, 
that it was not meant as a complete formulary.21 The Court starts 
out, in the Los Angeles R.R. case, with an action which, for a 
thousand and one good reasons, should not be reviewed. It con-
cludes by observing that the formal characteristics of the adminis-
trative activity are not of the definitive character which might 
compel review even though review is otherwise inappropriate. 
Even if the definition is open to criticism, it does not follow that 
its application in the context of the case led to an improper result. 
The same can be said for the short shrift given to the allegation 
that the valuation "injure[d] the credit of the carrier with the 
public," which incidentally was in all the circumstances a vague 
and implausible allegation. Critics point out that later cases have 
found defamation a sufficient "injury" on which to ground a 
right to review.22 But surely it does not follow that every action 
of a governmental official which impairs a person's credit is for 
that reason alone reviewable. Here, indeed, is , the very bite of 
such doctrines as ripeness and exhaustion, i.e., that, though an 
official action, be it an investigation, the filing of a complaint or 
what-not, may impair credit or reputation,28 and though, assuming 
that the proposed action is ultra vires, such a consequence is un-
fortunate, there may be countervailing considerations against im-
mediate judicial intervention. 
The twenty-nine years between Los Angeles (1927) and the 
Frozen Food Express case24 (1956) saw a movement away from the 
restrictive implications of Mr. Justice Brandeis' formulation of 
reviewability, at least insofar as more or less formal actions were 
in question. A few months after the decision in Los Angeles, the 
Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis again writing, decided The Assigned 
Car Cases,25 a title given by the reporter to a group of cases seek-
ing to "enjoin and annul an order of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission establishing a general rule of coal car distribution, 
including 'assigned cars'-i.e., privately owned cars and railroad 
fuel cars placed at specified mines for the use of particular ship-
21 But cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942): "The criteria governing judicial review of 'orders' under the 
Urgent Ddicicncies Act were defined ••. in United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co." 
Id. at 429. 
22 As in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). 
23 Cf. Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
2-1 Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956). 
25 274 U.S. 564 (1927). 
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pers."26 No question, so far as one can tell, was raised whether 
this was a reviewable "order" under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. 
Distinguishing the case in his dissent in Columbia Broadcasting 
System v. United States, Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that viola-
tions of the rules there promulgated subjected "the carrier to a 
fine of 100 dollars for each offense, [and] ... since the failure to 
comply with the order would bring immediate legal sanction the 
order was held reviewable."27 In the same dissent he also dis-
tinguished the Court's decision in Rochester Telephone Corp. 
v. United States,28 in which he had written a justly celebrated 
opinion. The primary thrust of Rochester has been to do away 
with the so-called "negative order" doctrine, a doctrine which, 
riddled with illogical exceptions, had provided that certain deter-
minations were not reviewable as "orders" because they did not 
go beyond denying relief and were thus not "directed against" 
anyone, i.e., did not command (did not "order"). Rochester made 
clear that an order was ripe though it did nothing more than 
classify or establish a status, when the effect of the declaration of 
status was to make applicable forthwith a corpus of statutes and 
regulations.29 
The majority in CBS, however, rejected as a requirement of 
reviewability that a regulation carry with it a sanction automatic 
in form. This case involved an action by a "chain" or "network" 
contesting the validity of the FCC's so-called Chain Broadcasting 
Regulations. The FCC has the power to license broadcasters on a 
periodic basis. Many of these licensees secure a large and important 
block of their programs from a so-called chain or network. The 
network is not, as such, a broadcaster, though each of the networks 
is itself a licensee of a certain number (limited by the Commission) 
26 Id. at 565-66. 
27 316 U.S. at 434. But the question of reviewability was, as has been noted, not 
adverted to. Note also that some of the suits were brought by coal mine operators, 
coal distributors and large private coal consumers who were not within the command 
of the regulation. 
28 307 U.S. 125 (1939). 
29 Rochester would appear to rob Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596 (1938), 
of all of its force. The latter was a determination of the ICC that a railroad was 
not "an interurban electric railway"; as a consequence it was subject to the Railway 
Labor Act. Refusing to review, the Court (per Brandeis, J.) said that this was but 
the determination of a "fact" and merely a "preparation for possible action" in the 
future, and thus was not an "order" under the Urgent .Deficiencies Act. However, 
the Court thereafter entertained a bill in equity to review such a determination, saying 
that it "subjected" the railroad to "the requirements" of the Railway Labor Act. This 
analysis would seem to bring it within the Rochester formulation of a "reviewable order." 
Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938). 
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of stations. The network and the licensee enter into a contract 
which obligates the network to provide programs under given 
terms and obligates the licensee to reserve a minimum amount of 
time or to take a minimum of programs. The Commission, con-
cerned by the monopolistic power of the chains, issued regulations 
governing the terms of the network contracts. Because the Com-
mission had no power directly to regulate the networks, the regula-
tions were directed to the licensee. The regulations were, as stated 
by the Commission, nothing more than the expression of the gen-
eral policy "we will follow in exercising our licensing power."30 
Furthermore, the Commission, after the filing of CBS's complaint, 
promulgated a supplementary "minute" to the effect that no 
licensee which litigated the validity of the regulation unsuccess-
fully would lose his license. The chain could suffer no more than 
a loss of its contractual advantage; a licensee would be required 
to obey the regulation only after an unsuccessful contest. 
Let it first be pointed out that at least in theory there are two 
distinct questions in the case. The network could never be "sub-
ject" to the order. It could no doubt intervene in any of the 
licensing proceedings in which the validity of one of its contracts 
was in question. But, since the licensee might without contest 
choose to accede to the regulation,31 the occasion for intervention 
might never arise. Thus, more acute than the question of "ripe-
ness" is the question of "standing" vel non. To deny relief here 
may be equivalent to a denial of all relief, in sum to a decision 
that the network has no "legally protected interest."32 If it be 
thought, however, that it does have such an interest, there may be 
no later point significantly different from the present, i.e., now, 
as later, the claim is that the network's freedom to negotiate is 
impaired. To be sure, as a practical matter, the Court could, if 
it seemed more appropriate, wait for a licensee challenge and then 
if none was forthcoming entertain the network's challenge. 
The Court in CBS concluded that the Chain Broadcasting 
Regulation had "the force of law" and, having the force of law, 
was a reviewable order. The Commission itself had purported to 
be exercising the "rule-making power"; its order prescribed "rules 
so Quoted in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 422 
(1942). 
31 It is sometimes suggested that a network qua licensee could raise the point. But 
a network does not operate its own stations under contract. As to them it has com-
plete freedom and so can never be directly affected by the regulation. 
82 I consider the standing question in Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Private 
Actions, 75 HARv. L. REV. 255, 261 (1961). 
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which govern the contractual relationships between the stations 
and the networks."33 To the objection that application of the rules 
-particularly in the form of a penalty or forfeiture-depended 
on a further proceeding (and thus, it is implied, on a further 
exercise of administrative discretion), Mr. Justice Stone replied, 
"Most rules of conduct having the force of law are not self-execut-
ing but require judicial or administrative action to impose their 
sanctions."34 Stone might have said with Holmes that law is nothing 
more than a prophecy of what a court will do in a particular case; 
and a formally adopted "regulation" rates pretty high in the scale 
of prophecy. To be sure, this reasoning does not prove that there 
need be or should be intervention before the actual imposition of 
sanction, but it is enough, I think, to bring CBS within the under-
lying premise of Assigned Car. Should the court intervene before 
the axe is on its way down? It is universally agreed that it should 
in some cases. Administrative law borrows from equity the notion 
· that it may be unfair to require a person to incur the risk of 
punishment or forfeiture in order to learn whether or not a line 
of conduct is valid. The plaintiff in CBS could show no more than 
the loss of opportunity for the making of profitable contracts-
in short, serious financial loss. Its position was similar to that of 
the coal miners and consumers who would, if the railroads obeyed 
the regulation in Assigned Car, lose prior economic advantages. 
To be sure, in the hierarchy of legal values such mediately imposed 
losses do not appear to count for so much as the loss decreed against 
a named individual by law: imprisonment, fine, forfeiture. The 
latter two, however, are in substance just another form of financial 
loss. 
If it is posited that an administrative action is (a) illegal and 
(b) will interfere with the plaintiff's pre-existing freedoms or 
powers, why should not present or imminent financial loss suf-
fice? It should, I think, suffice, if the occasion is otherwise propi-
tious.35 It was not propitious in Los Angeles; it was in CBS. After 
due formality, after the taking of evidence and the hearing of 
interested persons, the agency's policy had been given a precise 
form. It is doubtful that in any particular future licensing pro-
ceedings the record would have been more favorable for either 
administrative or judicial judgment. This does not mean that 
33 316 U.S. at 417. 
34 Id. at 418. 
35 This assumes, of course, that it has been decided that the complainant does have 
a "legally protected interest." 
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later proceedings and applications could not throw new light on 
the matter. Much administration is a continuous process, and it 
is always open to the new light of experience. The administrative 
process does not lend itself easily to terminal points. If there is 
to be review, a point must be chosen which may be in some 
measure arbitrary. Nor is this fatal. If the administrative process 
never has said its last word, neither must the court be put to 
the election of having only one occasion-and that the indisput-
ably best occasion-to pronounce. 
The truth is that the administrative process is often quite un-
like an ordinary lawsuit in both form and function; it does not 
lend itself easily to the concepts of finality characteristic of the 
common-law action. Judicial review is a phase of the administra-
tive process and thus must in some measure partake of its ongoing-
ness. Consider how little like the judgment in a lawsuit is the 
determination by a court that, because an agency has given a 
wrong reason for its action, it must reconsider its action! No 
"rights" are as a consequence of such a decision "finally" ad-
judicated. Time and again the agency responds simply by repub-
lishing its action with the right reasons. If there are occasions 
when early review is inopportune, there is on the other hand an 
aspect of much administration which warrants review in situations 
lacking some traditional aspects of finality. I refer to administra-
tion which regulates in a fairly comprehensive fashion, in a fashion 
which determines, not isolated transactions, but the organization 
and operation of an enterprise. The public has an interest in early 
implementation of policy; the regulated person has a legitimate 
interest whether to plan, or not to plan, his operation on the basis 
of a regulation. This argues for review as soon as it becomes possible 
to frame the issues in a form on which the judicial power can act 
effectively. Behind the reluctance to accept this position has been 
the feeling-now more or less dormant-that the judicial power 
is at the worst an alien intruder and at best a clumsy resource-
a necessary evil-to be avoided wherever and however possible. 
Now that the judiciary is no longer generally hostile to the ad-
ministrative process and has established and accepted for itself a 
limited role, it need no longer operate in the gingerly self-deprecat-
ing manner of a guilt-conscious, barely-tolerated intruder. It 
need only ask how, given its limited role, it can provide efficiently, 
with due regard for its limited competence, the service which it is 
duly bound to give to those who have a legitimate interest in the 
legality of the challenged action. 
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Storer Broadcasting Co.36 and Frozen Food,31 both in the same 
volume of the Supreme Court reports, can be taken to extend 
somewhat further than CBS the notions of reviewable order and 
ripeness. Storer, as was true of CBS, involved a "legislative" regu-
lation; it provided that no person could have more than a certain 
number of broadcasting licenses; and, under the subsidiary regu-
lation, certain interlocking stock ownerships could constitute own-
ership. The basic regulation, of course, could operate only as to 
future additional grants, but a purchase of stock either in the 
Storer Company or in another existing licensed operation might 
bring to pass a holding by Storer in excess of the allowed ma.xi-
mum. I>Jssenting, Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the case was not 
within the principle of CBS, or even within the principle of the 
just recently decided Frozen Food; 38 the injury could accrue, he 
agreed, only if Storer applied for and was denied an additional 
station: the potentiality of a denial did not threaten the present 
investment.39 The majority noted that "Storer cannot cogently 
plan its present or future operations. It cannot plan to enlarge 
the number of its standard or FM stations, and at any moment the 
purchaser of Storer's voting stock by some member of the public 
could endanger its existing structure."40 
Frozen Food extends CBS in another respect, in a respect 
which one may characterize as formal. The Interstate Commerce 
Act requires a license for motor carriage of goods but exempts 
from the requirement the carriage of "agricultural commodi-
ties."41 Controversy has raged over the years as to the meaning 
of "agricultural commodities." The great difficulty is to distinguish 
between exempt agricultural commodities and non-exempt "man-
ufactured products thereof," more particularly to find the point 
at which "processing" becomes "manufacturing." The ICC under-
took a full-scale "investigation" in which the carriers, the Secretary 
of Agriculture, state utility commissions, some states, etc., partici-
pated. It issued a "Report" entitled "Determination of Exempted 
Agricultural Commodities."42 This report stated the general prin-
36 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 
37 Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956). 
38 From which he also dissented. 
39 Mr. Justice Harlan did not address himself specifically to the possibility of a 
stock purchase bringing on a violation of the regulation. He might say that this remote 
possibility does not in fact work any immediate loss of the present investment. 
40 351 U.S. at 200. 
41 Motor Carrier Act § 203(b)(6), 49 Stat. 545 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(6) (1958). 
42 52 M.C.C. 511 (1951). 
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ciples for distinguishing between processing and manufacturing. 
It applied the principles to certain "groups," "classes" and in-
dividual products; some of these applications did not command 
a unanimous vote. The final section of the report is headed "Find-
ings" and embodies a list of exempted commodities (impliedly 
or expressly. excluding certain others from the exempted class). 
The report concludes: "An appropriate order will be entered 
discontinuing the proceeding."43 It is common ground that this 
is not a "regulation" in the sense that a disregard of it would be 
a punishable violation of the statute. It is a so-called "interpretive" 
regulation. It was to serve as a prima facie guide in Commission 
cease-and-desist proceedings or in Commission enforcement policy, 
i.e., in its decisions to initiate judicial proceedings for the viola-
tion of the statute itself. Mr. Justice Harlan, in dissent, noted that 
despite the report the Commission in cease-and-desist proceedings 
was willing to hear new evidence and reconsider its determinations 
with respect to particular commodities.44 The plaintiff in Frozen 
Food, at least in its complaint if not by later evidence, challenged 
the "order" in its applications to nearly all the classes, groups, and 
individual items insofar as it denied exemptions. The Secretary 
of Agriculture intervened, supporting the plaintiff, Frozen Food, 
as to eight or so of these items. The trial court dismissed the 
action, citing Los Angeles. The Court reversed. The order "has 
an immediate and practical 'impact on carriers who are transport-
ing the commodities, and on shippers as well. The 'order' of the 
Commission warns every carrier, who does not have authority from 
the Commission to transport those commodities, that it does so 
at the risk of incurring criminal penalties."45 
Frozen Food is, in my opinion, correct in refusing to make an 
absolute distinction between a "legislative" and an "interpretive" 
regulation. I do, however, question the propriety of judicial review 
of the issues as actually framed in that case. Equity has been pre-
pared to enjoin a "threat" of prosecution, a "threat," that is to 
say, in the sense of a decision or course of decision to initiate judi-
cial enforcement based on an official interpretation. An inter-
pretative regulation would seem capable of satisfying both the 
43 Id. at 557-58. 
44 It had indeed done so in the companion case, East Texas Lines v. Frozen Food 
Express, 351 U.S. 49 (1956), though it did not alter its earlier conclusion. That case 
did involve a cease-and-desist order forbidding the carriage of frozen poultry without 
a license. 
45 351 U.S. at 44. 
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formal order requirement and the basic immediacy requirement 
of equity; but it does not follow that every formal interpretation 
should be forthwith reviewed, whether as an order or in equity. 
In Frozen Food the issues as framed were not well-adapted to 
review, and the plaintiff's need was not great. The plaintiff's 
pleading does not go beyond the assertion that the Commission 
had improperly classified a few dozen or so products. No doubt 
there is some common question running through a number of 
these controversies, although the Court does not explicate it. 
The Court does not isolate any general question for consideration. 
It simply throws back to the district court a job which threatens 
to duplicate the Commission's general investigation. Represented 
before the Court are the Commission, Frozen Food, the Secretary 
of Agriculture, and some trucking associations and railroads. The 
order does not rest on a formal record. Are the various agricultural 
interests to be summoned, evidence heard on each and every item, 
and then, as to each, decision made?46 Given the awkwardness of 
judicial review of such issues, one is more amazed at the con-
clusion that it was urgently needed. In the companion case Frozen 
Food's right to carry frozen poultry was squarely raised by the 
Commission's cease-and-desist order. The question common to all 
the cases, the line between processing and manufacturing, was 
ruled on there by the Court. That case itself exposed the purely 
fictitious character of the risk of criminal prosecution: it made it 
clear that the Commission was proceeding case by case, using a 
prospective cease-and-desist order approach. And there was noth-
ing in the pleadings to suggest that Frozen Food's plans for the 
future went beyond its current concern with chickens. The case, 
in my opinion, reflects a disposition, not uncommon in the deci-
sions and discussion in this area, to decide on the basis of formal 
rather than practical criteria of ripeness: that at least is true of 
both the majority and the minority opinions in Frozen Food. 
Frozen Food can be taken to embody the concept that an 
administrative action having a fairly formal aspect is reviewable 
(at least as an "order") despite the fact that its precise dispositive 
character is uncertain or ambiguous. If despite its inconclusive dis-
positive character an administrative action has evoked a clear-cut 
legal question as to its validity and if the plaintiff's interest is substan-
tial, review, in my opinion, is not inappropriate. Frozen Food, 
46 In Lester C. Newton Trucking Co. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 600 (D. Del. 1962), 
review was of an "interpretative order" as to certain products. The court refused to 
review general language in the order except as it applied to the products in question. 
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to be sure, is strictly, as is Storer, a decision as to whether the 
action is a reviewable order under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. 
But it would not be going too far, I think, to say that where no 
provision for review is made, the general principles deducible 
from those cases should govern a review of any formal act whether 
by declaration or equity procedure. The failure to provide for 
review may, of course, suggest a question of reviewability vel non. 
But if that obstacle is hurdled, the principles developed in the 
Urgent Deficiencies Act cases should govern.47 On those principles 
I would think that Eccles v. Peoples Bank48 was wrongly decided. 
That was a case of a completed, formal, dispositive order condi-
tioning the sale of plaintiff's stock. It is very hard to follow Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter's demonstration that the plaintiff's concern 
was "too speculative to warrant anticipatory judicial determina-
tions. "40 
47 In the following cases where relief was given, the precise legal effect of the action 
was uncertain. Mid-Valley Distilling Corp. v. De Carlo, 161 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1947) 
(construed as an order of "suspension, revocation or annulment"); Parkhill Truck Co. 
v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Okla. 1961) (the construction of plaintiff's license 
having been taken as a premise for the grant of a license to another, involved in effect 
an attack on the license grant, and plaintiff was held entitled to a hearing before 
grant); Brigham v. FCC, 276 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960) (FCC declaratory ruling as to 
licensee's responsibility reviewable-both parties agreed to review, citing inter alia Caples 
Co. v. United States, 243 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where, however, question of review• 
ability was not adverted to). Note that if the declaratory ruling is pursuant to § 5(d) 
of the AP A, the ruling has "like effect as in the case of other orders," and is thus 
reviewable. . 
Quite difficult to place and judge in my scheme is Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167 
F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948). The FCC in its so-called "Blue Book," a "Report" on "Public 
Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees," cited plaintiff's record as a bad example. Plain-
tiff sued for declaratory relief under the APA. At the same time plaintiff's license was 
simultaneously undergoing renewal proceedings involving precisely the same issue. The 
court dismissed on the ground of no "agency action," after first holding that the FCC's 
remarks were an unprivileged libel. It was perhaps the court's view that the proper 
relief was an action in libel (plaintiff: was seeking withdrawal of the remarks). But is 
this not a case of activity within the area of administrative investigation more or less 
ancillary to the performance of its licensing function? It is at best a doubtful case 
for review, and, since Hearst could canvass the same question in the renewal proceedings, 
there seems no reason for stretching reviewability concepts. One judge concurred, with-
out opinion, in the result. Hearst is cited by Bazelon, J., in Kukatush Mining Corp. v. 
SEC, 309 F.2d 647, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1962), apropos of the publication of a list of securities 
being, in the opinion of the SEC, marketed in violation of the Securities Act. Both 
majority and minority, however, do give it as their opinion that the publication of 
this list without a hearing is not ultra vires. Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 304 F.2d 290 (5th 
Cir. 1962). 
48 333 U.S. 426 (1948). I do not regard Continental Bank 8e Trust Co. v. Martin, 
303 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1962), as following Eccles. The court there interpreted the order 
to the bank to increase its capital as a preliminary to a later cease-and-desist order. 
It emphasized particularly the novelty of the Board's proceeding. It was obviously con-
cerned with giving the Board further opportunity to develop its procedure. The court 
might have allowed review, but its decision is supportable as an exercise of discretion. 
49 333 U.S. at 432. He emphasized that sanction for violation of the condition was 
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Now, criteria for determining "ripeness" are more difficult 
where the administrative action does not have the usual indicia of 
formality supplied by a "regulation," an "order," or a pleading. 
One can suppose that Mr. Justice Harlan's demand in Frozen 
Food for a more formal criterion was based on a belief that it was 
necessary in order that "the line be drawn" somewhere. If risk 
of legal sanction or doubt as to the future suffices, then will it not 
follow that whenever an agency indicates an adverse attitude the 
occasion is ripe for judicial action; indeed, would it not be enough 
that the plaintiff is in doubt and the agency is not prepared to 
relieve his doubt? To this, the response might be, why not indeed? 
Why not remove the plaintiff's doubt? The answer is that there are 
cases where, though no formal action has been taken, it is proper 
to grant relief and that there are cases where it is not; and this 
uncertainty does constitute an admission that the lack of a 
strictly formal test creates difficulties. But do these difficulties go 
beyond the intellectual burden thus placed on the courts, a burden 
which is not in itself a reason against flexibility? To this the an-
swer must be that there remains the risk, which, if it should not 
be exaggerated, nevertheless has some weight, that interference 
with the administrative process at this early stage may be inappro-
priate. Individuals may be encouraged to run to the courts early 
and late with their fears, their doubts and their recalcitrance. 
Negotiation is the major mode of administration, of resolving the 
continuous uncertainties of fact and law. If it is made too easy 
to bring every administrative expression, however informal, into 
court, negotiation may be hampered. Those who feel that the 
public authorities have a basically unfair leverage will welcome 
this. Those who think that for the most part private and public 
power are fairly matched will not wish to put too many obstac_les 
in the path of accommodation. I would conclude that presump-
tively informal expressions covering the meaning and application 
of a statute do not warrant judicial determination of the con-
troversy, but that the presumption can be overcome. 
III. THE APPROACH OF EQUITY 
The proper approach at this point is the approach of equity. 
Let us refer once more to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's formulation. 
a future matter. This hardly disposed of the claim accepted as decisive by the minority 
that the condition impaired the present marketability of the stock. 
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We look to ttvo aspects: (1) the posture of the question at issue-
its reducibility to judicial determination, and (2) the predicament 
of the plaintiff-whether he, as equity traditionally puts it, has 
an adequate remedy at law. Let us canvass this approach by in-
stancing a few representative cases. Consider the equitable doc-
trine that, though normally the alleged improper enforcement of 
a criminal statute will not be enjoined, repeated threats of en-
forcement may suffice to ground jurisdiction. This rule seeks to 
preserve administrative discretion as to enforcement; but if the 
plaintiff is subjected to a continuing risk of substantial propor-
tions, a risk which he is unable to terminate by appeals to the usual 
processes of the law, he makes a case for equitable relief. It would 
seem that it should not be a "threat" in its literal sense which is 
required, but a substantial and immediate risk of irreparable in-
jury. The "threat" is ordinarily taken as evidence of the intent 
of the administrative agency to take action, but it should be con-
sidered as an instance of a broader category, as simply one kind of 
concrete manifestation of the likelihood of "irreparable injury."50 
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in Shields v. Utah Idaho Central 
R.R.,r,1 said in support of plaintiff's bill in equity that "it is 
essential to the protection of the rights asserted"; he noted "the 
peculiar difficulty which confronts" a plaintiff when subject to 
one of two competing jurisdictions. If "irreparable injury" is 
likely, a "threat" should not be required. Indeed, one might go 
farther and not invariably require the injury to be "irreparable." 
Judgment should be keyed to the relative value of early and later 
review as determined by practical considerations of judicial com-
petence, administrative efficiency and party need. Thus, in Shields, 
the "threat" of "criminal prosecution" was purely formal. If the 
60 Embassy Dairy, Inc. v. Camalier, 211 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1954), is a characteristic 
case. Plaintiff protested the validity of an order forbidding the processing of milk. 
Violation of the order was punishable as a crime. Cf. Fanner v. United Elec. Union, 211 
F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954), in which a union was threatened with immediate disqualifica-
tion as a lawful collective bargaining agent. This might result in exclusion from 
ballots and other irreparable injury. Note also the lack of any other remedy, and see 
Keopke v. Fontecchio, 177 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1949). With these cases is to be compared 
the hostility toward declaratory relief shown in Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 
(1948), discussed supra. 
I do not deal with cases involving constitutional issues other than to repeat my 
suggestion that restrictive notions of justiciability displayed in declaratory and equity 
proceedings reflect caution in the exercise of the constitutional adjudication function. 
Cf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). To what degree such caution 
is consistently displayed is a study in itself. 
61 305 U.S. 177, 183 (1938). 
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railroad were denied early review and required to present its de-
fense in a prosecution for failing to post notices under the Rail-
way Labor Act, 52 it would be understood that the purpose of the 
lawsuit was to test the question of validity. It is unthinkable that 
a penalty would have been imposed on the railroad for raising an 
obviously bona fide claim. And the same is true of many so-called 
"threats." Of course, where vindictive officers threaten large and 
numerous penalties attempting thus to avoid judicial review, the 
"threat of irreparable injury" is very real. I make the point, rather, 
that, where as in Shields there are excellent reasons for immediate 
clarification and there are present neither "threats" nor "irrep-
arable injury" in any realistic sense, the court should neverthe-
less take jurisdiction. On the other hand, not every "threat" suf-
fices; the beginning of an investigation, the filing of a complaint 
is a "threat"; but clearly the administrative process must, other 
than in exceptional circumstances, be allowed to take its course,58 
and will ordinarily provide an "adequate remedy." It is well 
established that the potentially adverse consequences of litigation 
-expense, even loss of credit and reputation-may have to be 
borne.54 It is hoped that, if the individual eventually prevails on 
the merits, at least his reputation if not his pocketbook will be 
refurbished. This, of course, will not always happen. If there is 
a clean-cut question of jurisdiction anterior to the merits and, 
despite later success on the jurisdictional question, trial of the 
merits will have worked irreversible loss of reputation, there 
52 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 
(1958). 
53 In this sense Miles Lab., Inc. v. FTC, 140 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1944), is a standard 
case. See also Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 207 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1953), in• 
volving a "threat" by the Maritime Administration to collect moneys allegedly owing 
by asserting a set-off against moneys owing to the plaintiff (which had brought a 
declaratory action). Plaintiff, of course, had the usual remedy in the Court of Claims 
to sue for sums owing. Furthermore, the claim of the United States was based on the 
renegotiation of a contract which plaintiff was attempting to contest in this way rather 
than by the statutory administrative and judicial procedure. 
There is little point in trying to understand Bata Shoe Co. v. Perkins, 33 F. Supp. 
508 (D.D.C. 1940). On one view of the pleadings the plaintiffs were being compelled 
to take an unwarranted risk. But it is impossible to determine from the confusing 
opinion what the issues were. 
54 Once more one must distinguish the problem in these cases from that in Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., discussed in the text at notes 4-5 supra. That case in-
volved a final action which threatened to injure plaintiff's reputation. The question 
was whether reputation is legally protected against an allegedly illegal exercise of public 
power so as to entitle the plaintiff to review. But the question in "ripeness" and "ex-
haustion" cases is whether injury to reputation and credit is sufficient to justify review 
now rather than later. 
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should be immediate review.55 But such a case is by its definition 
exceptional. 
IV. SOME DISPARATE RIPENESS CASES 
There still remain for consideration a handful of cases-some 
typical, some not-which exemplify the difficulty of applying the 
general approach advocated here. They are all cases, as one would 
expect, in which the controversy has not yet been "firmed up" to 
a decisive administrative action. A number of them had sub-
stantial "administrative" significance. Consider Houston Post 
Co. v. United States.56 This was an attempt by a stranger to a 
licensing proceeding to review statements in an opinion to which 
the licensee himself either could not or would not take exception. 
The FCC, in renewing the license of a certain station, declared 
that the licensee must not in the future "censor" political broad-
casts. To obey this injunction involved some danger because of 
the then existing uncertainty as to whether the licensee was itself 
liable for all defamatory utterances broadcast by it.57 The licensee, 
itself, was prepared to bow to the FCC's view and promise to be-
have. The phenomenon was not a new one. Somewhat earlier, in 
the famous May-fioweri8 decision, the Commission had renewed 
a license on condition that the licensee would not "editorialize," 
i.e., express its opinion on public issues. Is there any way of test-
ing such resolutions short of "putting one's license on the line"? 
The Houston Post tried to review such a pronouncement as an 
"order" applicable to all licensees. Judge Hutcheson could not 
find his way clear to hold that doctrinal pronouncements in the 
course of a decision were reviewable by non-parties, though he did 
go on to give an "advisory" opinion in the plaintiff's favor. Per-
haps plaintiff's mistake was in seeking review of the "opinion" as 
an "order" under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. At that time CBS 
had, but Frozen Food had not, been decided. If Frozen Food's 
umbrella does not cover "opinions," perhaps equity should be 
1111 I have so argued in The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L. 
REv. 327 (1963). 
56 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948). 
57 The Supreme Court later decided that a licensee was not liable for defamatory 
broadcasts which it was without power to censor. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. 
WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959). 
liS Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940). In its report on editorializing 
by broadcast licensees, the Commission abandoned its rule against licensee self-expression 
so long as the licensee gives fair representation to competing views. 1 p & F RADIO 
REcs. 11 91:21 (1949). 
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prepared to avoid the risk to plaintiff of a loss of license. Is there 
indeed such a risk? Would the Commission forfeit the license of 
one who sought a bona fide test of the issue? Should it not be 
made clear by the agency that the declaratory procedure of sec-
tion 5(d) of the APA is available? 
We are presented here with a phenomenon sometimes called 
"jawbone" administration. The FCC cannot be completely ab-
solved of a suspicion that it uses the leverage of license risk to 
insulate from review doubtful applications of its powers. In a 
recent case, of some significance, revoking a license for alleged 
obscenities, an exercise of power raising questions under the first 
amendment, the FCC was careful to place its decision on an alter-
nate ground which, with an apparent eye to judicial review, the 
Commission anticipatorily pronounced would alone have moved 
it to revoke.59 It might at least, as it did in CBS, devise a procedure 
to eliminate the risk of challenge, and it may be that it is indeed 
developing procedures to that end.60 There might still be a fear 
of retaliation, given the vague, highly discretionary powers of the 
Commission. However, our law-world is not a perfect one and 
some policy of inviting judicial review of basic questions would 
eliminate most of the risk. One might ask whether there is in fact 
a real problem here, and, if so, what it is. A great deal is said in 
administrative and judicial opinions by way of argumentation and 
example which awakens doubts and fears among lawyers and the 
public. To subject all the expressions and applications of an 
opinion to judicial review would increase the hazards of ·writing 
opinions, would constrict the desirable area of negotiation and 
would embarrass the courts. The answer may be not an absolute 
rule against review, but equitable discretion exercised along the 
broad lines developed here. In applying this discretion a court 
may well take into account the apparent disposition of an agency, 
59 Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962). 
oo The Commission has on occasion given "declaratory rulings," warnings, etc., to 
licensees. Some of these are asked for by the licensee; some are in reply to complaints. 
In two cases of declaratory rulings no objection was taken to review. Brigham v. FCC, 
276 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960); Caples Co. v. United States, 243 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
The Commission also has the power to issue cease-and-desist orders. In Metropolitan 
Broadcasting Corp., 19 P &: F RA.mo REcs. 602 (F.C.C. Jan. 6, 1960), the Commission 
addressed a letter to a licensee "with reference to certain applications," concluding, 
"It is expected that in the future operations of all your stations you will be guided 
by the views which we have set forth above." How does the licensee cope with such a 
letter? Could he ask that it be denominated a "declaratory ruling," a "cease-and-desist 
order"? If formally denominated a "declaratory ruling," it should be reviewable under 
APA§ 5(d). 
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by the latent threat of its power, to extend its reach into debatable 
areas by devices calculated to avoid judicial review. 
A somewhat similar constellation of factors was involved in the 
well-known Belco Products Co. v. lvI.cNutt.61 Helco proposed a 
shipment of poppy seed with a "harmless vegetable dye." It sought 
an opinion from the Food and Drug Administration as to whether 
the product was "adulterated." The Commissioner gave his opin-
ion that it was. Helco then sought to learn from the Attorney 
General whether he agreed and whether the United States would 
institute condemnation. The Attorney General replied that he 
was authorized "by law to give opinions only to the President 
and heads of Executive Departments."62 Helco then sought a 
declaratory judgment. The court was unwilling on this record 
to bring the case within the category of "threats" because the 
declaration of the Administrator was,several steps removed from 
a threat of prosecution; the Attorney General's action was not 
controlled by the Administrator's. Similar reasons have been used 
to deny declaratory relief in cases under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, a law which, full of baffling questions of application, gives 
rise to the penalty of double wage payments. There is no formal 
administrative proceeding to help employers in doubt. In one case 
the court stated: "It cannot be said that the petitioner is seeking 
advice upon a purely hypothetical situation. The petitioner has 
a real problem, and a response by the Court would undoubtedly 
be of immediate benefit to it in a concrete way."63 
But "interpretative bulletins" by the Administrator, the court 
in Belco concluded, did not create an "actual controversy." The 
Administrator has not "threatened" enforcement and the Attorney 
General, who has the ultimate authority, has done nothing. This 
nice analysis of the imminence of the "threat" does not, of course, 
deal realistically with the likelihood of irreparable injury. It does, 
no doubt, have relevance to the opportunities for the exercise of 
discretion prior to enforcement or settlement which may be per-
tinent to a case of this sort, particularly if the case were thought to 
involve not a general question but one of application. It is just 
when the question raised is one of particular application to plain-
tiff that early declaratory procedure causes the most difficulty for 
61 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943). 
62 Id. at 682. 
63 F. W. Maurer &: Sons Co. v. Andrews, 30 F. Supp. 637, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1939). 
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the courts. In Helco the court relied, for example, on John P. 
Agnew & Co. v. Hoage,64 in which an employer sought to know 
whether certain persons were employees; if so, he would be obliged 
to take out compensation insurance. If he cannot find the answer 
he will, of course, have to spend money on insurance which may 
turn out to be unnecessary. This is surely unfortunate, and a legal 
system which does not provide machinery for such advance deter-
mination is to that degree defective. But it is at least a question 
whether the court's declaratory judgment procedure should fill 
up such a large and widespread procedural gap. One might see the 
translation of administration into the courts if each proposed ap-
plication could be transferred there. 
If, in Helco, a single pilot shipment of poppy seed were in 
question, the risk to plaintiff would not be a great one. But the 
Administrator has at times _instituted multiple seizures prior to 
the trial of any of them. This tactic is obviously designed to put 
the product off the market before it is adjudicated to be offensive.611 
The trade, at least, feels that the threat of this exercise of power 
is used to bring it to book in doubtful cases. Perhaps the abuse of 
power, if any, is inherent in the statutory scheme. The leverage 
inherent in discretion to enforce the law is to some extent un-
avoidable and to some extent desirable in promoting negotiation 
and settlement in areas of legal or factual doubt. To intervene 
judicially at the point where discretion has not ripened into formal 
determination, either by general rule or by an order in the plain-
tiff's case, requires the exercise of a tactful and discriminating 
judgment. It would seem that what is needed in situations of this 
type, i.e., where persons are required to make difficult legal judg-
ments at the risk of penalties, is a flexible, perhaps discretionary, 
administrative procedure: one which permits the question to be 
"firmed up" for a declaratory order. It is at least a question 
whether, given the failure to provide such a procedure, the courts 
should fill the gap by allowing free and regular resort to the 
declaratory and equity power. 
It remains to consider one case which most students, including 
myself, have found it hard to accept. It is, nevertheless, a case 
64 99 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
65 In one such case, Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. Ewing, 87 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 
1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 594 (1950), by a six-to-two vote, a trial court, believing tbe mul-
tiple seizure provision to be misused and finding no danger to health, enjoined all 
but one suit. On appeal tbe majority held tbat tbe Government's statutory right to 
multiple seizure was absolute. 
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which when closely studied involves some subtleties which, if 
not determinative of the result, do create problems. This is Inter-
national Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd.66 The plaintiffs were a 
local union and two of its officers, both resident aliens. They sued 
on behalf of the union and all resident aliens. The action was one 
for injunction and declaration against the District Director of 
Immigration at Seattle. The union represented seasonal workers 
in the Alaska fish canneries who were resident in the continental 
United States. Resident aliens who leave the United States (even 
for a moment, unless it be as seaman on an American ship) are 
required on reentry to go through the same inspection process 
and, with certain exceptions, are subject to the same grounds of 
exclusion as a new entrant. The grounds of exclusion are much 
more numerous than the grounds for deportation. For example, 
a resident alien may be deported if he has been convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of 
entry or at any time after entry is convicted of two such crimes. 
A new entrant is excludable if he has at any time been convicted 
of one such crime. In this and in other respects involving dis-
reputable or unpleasant characteristics, one not deportable is 
excludable on reentry. The Director of Immigration had taken 
the position that a permanent resident alien who had gone from 
the continental United States to Alaska was excludable on the 
same terms as one who had gone to a foreign country. The plain-
tiffs challenged the interpretation and, if correct, its constitution-
ality. They pleaded that "there is a present threat . . . to . . . 
status." The individual plaintiffs also alleged that they and three 
others were presently the object of deportation proceedings. The 
district court took jurisdiction and upheld the director's inter-
pretation.67 A majority of the Supreme Court-the opinion by 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter-held that this was not "a lawsuit to 
enforce a right; it is an endeavor to obtain a court's assurance 
that a statute does not govern hypothetical situations that may 
or may not make the challenged statute applicable."68 Perhaps 
oo 347 U.S. 222 (1954). The lower court took jurisdiction and gave judgment for 
the defendant. 111 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Wash. 1953). The Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment and gave directions to dismiss the complaint. 
67 This interpretation has since been held to be wrong. United States ex rel. Alcantra 
v, Boyd, 222 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1955). 
68 347 U.S. at 224. All of his citations are to constitutional cases. It is true that 
the plaintiffs did raise a constitutional issue, but the issue of statutory construction was 
in the forefront. Not even Mr. Justice Black, who disliked the law, in dissenting (with 
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter is right in characterizing the case as 
"hypothetical" in a sense in which the other cases with which we 
have dealt are not, since no facts are pleaded as to the potential 
excludability of the plaintiffs, though one might suggest as an 
analogy to the contrary his own decision in Rochester, in which it 
was found sufficient that the Commission's action established a 
"status." However, the only necessary consequence of the facts 
pleaded by the plaintiffs is that, assuming that they do go to 
Alaska and do return, they will be put through inspection as new 
entrants. This procedural modification of one's status is perhaps 
nothing more than unpleasant. None of the plaintiffs alleges that 
he or any one of the class has been convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude, or has a loathsome disease, or is likely to become 
a public charge, or is engaged in anarchist or subversive activity, 
etc. But are such self-accusing allegations the price of a judicial 
determination as to whether one may leave the country without 
the risk of exclusion on such grounds? It might perhaps have been 
possible to take a middle course: to allege, for example, that there 
were some-would it be necessary to name them?-who had been 
convicted of a crime or in some other concrete way were in 
jeopardy. But it should be remembered that there were many 
"radicals" among the longshoremen, that a number were already 
the object of deportation proceedings or of suspicion, and that the 
discretion of the authorities to exclude is wider than to deport and 
thus might afford considerable additional leverage against alleged 
"subversives." No doubt an argument can be made that one whose 
freedom of movement is in question because of a disreputable past 
(though not all of these grounds are disreputable) is not entitled 
to know the precise limits of his freedom. On the other hand, one 
who is not wholly sympathetic with the Draconian character of this 
legislation would hesitate to push its strictures any farther than 
is necessary. In any case, even a wrongdoer is entitled to know 
his rights. It is at this point that I must insist again on the truism 
that the concept of a case is not a precise one. It is a concept for 
the administration of justice. It points to what a court can appro-
priately do and what in justice it should do. Each of these factors, 
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter said elsewhere, affects the other: " ... 
whether 'justiciability' exists ... has most often turned on evaluat-
Mr. Justice Douglas) had much hope of invalidating it on the constitutional issue. 
"Maybe this is what Congress meant .... And maybe in these times such a law would 
be held constitutional." Id. at 226. 
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ing both the appropriateness of the issues for decision by courts 
and the hardship of denying judicial relief."69 In Boyd, hardship 
was clear despite the fact that its incidence with respect to any 
particular plaintiff was speculative; and the issue for decision as 
made by the pleadings was equally clear, namely, whether on his 
return a resident alien who has been to Alaska has the same status 
as an alien entering from a foreign country. This question was 
answered two years later in an actual exclusion case in precisely 
the same form as it was presented in Boyd, and nothing relevant 
to the issue had been added to the record by way of specific or 
general fact.70 In determining whether an issue is ripe for decision 
one must focus his attention on (though not limit it to) the issue 
made. If it is an organically separate issue, it does not cease to be 
one because it implicates a further range of issues which are not yet 
ripe.71 
V. REVIEWABLE ORDERS 
Statutes establishing administrative powers, particularly those 
exercised by the full-fledged administrative agency, often provide 
for review. The statutes originally providing for review of ICC 
actions72 stated simply that suits to enjoin, etc., any "order" of 
the Commission should be brought in the district court. Later 
statutes dealing with other agencies are more specific and these 
specifics may operate in a restrictive fashion. The addition of the 
word "final" before the word "order" is not, however, restrictive, 
since finality is taken by the courts in a broad sense. Thus, ap-
proval of a protested rate pending a hearing is a "final order." 
60 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951). 
70 But might a proponent of the Boyd case argue that, when finally a court was 
presented with an actual exclusion, as in the later case, the court was then led to 
pause and finally to reject a conclusion which would have so drastic an effect on the 
individual actually before them? 
71 A perhaps extreme instance of deciding one issue isolated from a large group 
of implicated, but not yet ripe, issues is Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control 
Bd., 367 U.S. I (1961) (opinion by Frankfurter, J.). 
72 For the most part, ICC orders are still reviewed under this so-called Urgent 
Deficiencies Act procedure, the name coming from the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, 
which established the form and venue of review. Later provisions, e.g., those relating 
to review of actions under the Motor Carrier Act § 205(h), 49 Stat. 550 (1935), 49 U.S.C. 
§ 305(g) (1958), were less laconic, but the additional definition probably added nothing 
of substance: "Any final order made under this chapter shall be subject to the same right 
of relief in court by any party in interest as is now provided in respect to orders of 
the Commission made under Chapter I of this title." (Emphasis added.) The italicized 
words embody concepts worked out by the Court for review of "orders" under the 
Urgent Deficiencies Act. 
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Finality depends, it is said, "upon a realistic appraisal of the con-
sequences of such action"; the test is the "irreparable injury 
threatened in the exceptional case by administrative rulings which 
attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other hear-
ings and adjudications that may follow."73 But a statute which 
provides for review of an "order" following a stated course of 
procedure will preclude the statutory review of the action qua 
"order" where the stated administrative process has not been com-
pleted or is not a prelude to the action in question. This, of course, 
does not mean that review is excluded in such cases. If not review-
able under the statute, the action may be reviewed in "equity" 
or by mandamus or declaratory order. The difference may or may 
not be significant. If the "orders" of an agency are reviewable in 
a court of appeals, venue, of course, will be different, since "non-
statutory" review will be in the form of an original action in a 
district court. Furthermore, whereas statutory review may be 
available as a matter of course, equity may require "irreparable 
injury," and a court may insist, in a mandamus proceeding, on a 
"clear" violation of law. 
The great foundation cases with which we have dealt in 
defining the concept of ripeness were cases in which, strictly 
viewed, the question was whether the protested action of the ICC 
was an "order" under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. We have now 
come to see that under that procedure the questions of ripeness 
and reviewable order should be treated as almost, if not exactly, 
the same question; the statutory reviewing court is a district court 
which almost from the beginning has drawn its inspiration and its 
definitions from principles of equity. If an action of the ICC would 
satisfy the ripeness requirements of a court of equity, it would 
seem for the most part that it should qualify as an "order" under 
the Urgent Deficiencies Act. Of course, the notion of an "order" 
implies some formal characteristics. Thus, a refusal to take juris-
73 Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.) (Fahy, J., in dissent-
ing, argued that one must proceed by bill in equity in a district court), cert. denied, 
347 U.S. 990 (1954). Accord, Trans-Pacific Freight Conference v. Federal Maritime Bd., 
302 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (agency action suspending assessment of fine on one of 
its members by a steamship association). Compare Local 438, Constr. Union v. Curry, 
371 U.S. 542 (1963); United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 
369 U.S. 850 (1962), applying the rule of substance rather than form in determining 
whether an order of a lower court is final. 
Conversely, a statute making reviewable "any order" will be read to require "finality.'' 
McManus v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1961); Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, 243 F.2d 
607 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
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diction is not an "order," and so mandamus is the proper remedy.74 
When the so-called "negative order" doctrine prevailed, certain 
actions refusing relief on the merits were held not to be "orders." 
Yet, in one instance a so-called "negative order"-not reviewable 
as an "order"75-was held reviewable in "equity";76 but shortly 
thereafter Rochester71 did away with the "negative order" doc-
trine, and such an order would, it seems, now be reviewable as 
an "order." 
In the much-cited case of FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,18 
the plaintiff sought review, as an "order," of the commencement 
by "an order" of an investigation to determine "the ownership, 
operation, management, and control" of the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff challenged the jurisdiction of the Commission. Review was 
provided by the statute for orders arising out of "proceedings 
under the Act"; there were requirements in the judicial review 
provision that there must have been a petition for "rehearing," 
that there be filed in a court a "transcript of records," that if find-
ings were supported by "substantial evidence" they be affirmed, 
etc. It would, of course, have been sufficient to hold that the 
"order" was not reviewable because it was "preliminary," but 
the Court spoke in more general terms: "The provision for 
review thus relates to orders of a definitive character dealing with 
the merits of a proceeding before the Commission and resulting 
from a hearing upon evidence .... "79 
This is a perfectly possible reading of the statute, but it has 
not been followed. It would mean that a great many orders of the 
FPC, which should be and will be reviewed, would have to be re-
viewed not in the regular statutory review courts (the courts of 
appeals) but by original bill in equity. There may, as has been 
suggested, be reasons for distinguishing the character of review 
afforded to different actions of an agency. Be that as it may, the 
earlier decisions were inclined to take a narrow view of a review- · 
74 United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC, 246 U.S. 638 (1918); ICC v. 
United States ex rel. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912). At this time the venue of 
mandamus actions was restricted to the District of Columbia which was different from 
that as to proceedings to review an "order." 
71i Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596 (1938) (determination that plaintiff was 
not an "interurban electric railway" not an "order'). 
76 Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938) (reviewing in equity an ICC 
determination that plaintiff was not an "interurban electric railway'). 
77 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939). 
78 304 U.S. 375 (1938). 
79 Id. at 384. 
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able order under the statute. It has been held that a decision of 
the SEC refusing confidential treatment to documents in its files 
is not an order;80 thus, though it is reviewable, it must be reviewed 
by a bill in equity.81 But by and large simplicity of system argued 
against such a distinction. Typical is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
FPC.82 This was an order suspending a rate filing. There had been 
no hearing, no record, no evidence, no findings. The test applied 
by the court was simply whether the order "finally determines the 
legal rights of the parties."83 This is, perhaps, a somewhat elusive 
test, since interlocutory rulings can usually be reconsidered. But 
it implies finality in the sense that later review comes too late to 
protect the asserted right. In a more recent case in the same cir-
cuit contesting the acceptance of a rate filing, the court, making 
specific reference to the language quoted above from Metropol-
itan, which, read literally, would have barred review under the 
statute, said: 
"Such language must be read in relation to the facts of the 
case and, so limited, does not establish an inflexible standard 
requiring a conventional hearing .... An order ... is review-
able when action taken in advance of hearings or adjudication 
result in the setting of legal consequences."84 
In some cases, however, courts have refused to review FPC 
regulations as "orders," and in so doing have fallen back on the 
language of Metropolitan emphasizing the requirement of a hear-
ing and a record. In one of these cases, Judge Bazelon goes so far 
as to say that "an appellate court has no intelligible basis for deci-
sion unless a subordinate tribunal has made a record fully en-
compassing the issues."85 He distinguishes CBS on the ground that 
80 Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 99 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 
1938) (citing the Metropolitan case). 
81 Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939). It was 
at this same time that the Supreme Court was going through the minuet of holding that 
a determination of the ICC which was not an "order" had to be reviewed by bill in 
equity. See notes 75-76 supra. 
82 227 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1005 (1956). 
83 Id. at 474. 
84 Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 
837 (1958); accord, Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1959). The following are 
cases in which an order has been held not reviewable: Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 304 F.2d 
290 (5th Cir. 1962) (statements by FPC that escalation clauses in filed contracts would 
not be given effect-these are clauses providing for future increases in contract rates); 
Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 285 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1960) (rejecting gas company's 
offer of a rate settlement). 
85 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 181 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1950). To the 
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in that case review was in a district court which could make a 
record. The remedy, therefore, if any, is by an original bill in 
equity. It is of interest that it was just at this time (1950) that 
the Hobbs Act86 was passed. This act transferred the venue for 
review of the particular orders of certain agencies from the dis-
trict courts to the courts of appeals and provided that, in the ab-
sence of a record, the court, if a genuine issue of fact is presented, 
should transfer the proceedings to a district court. This act does 
not, however, cover the FPC, and again in 1956 it was held, in 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. FPC,81 that "rules of general appli-
cability" are not reviewable under section 19(b) of the Natural 
Gas Act. The court there underlines the absence of "definitive 
orders entered after hearing and upon completion of the admin-
istrative process."88 But it also seeks to distinguish CBS on the 
ground that the order is not "self-executory and it does not com-
mand these petitioners to do or refrain from doing anything."89 
Frozen Food is not cited by the majority. "Whether," concludes 
the court, an original bill in equity can be brought "is not prop-
erly before us and consequently we need not resolve the apparent 
conflict in the authorities."90 This can hardly be said to be a 
sensible solution of a practical problem! 
The courts of appeals have been struggling valiantly with a 
comparable problem arising out of a recent amendment to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.91 This act transferred the tra-
ditional review of deportation orders from the district courts to 
the courts of appeals. These courts are to review "final order[s] 
of deportation." The question has arisen whether orders supple-
mentary or incidental to such orders, e.g., a refusal to suspend an 
order of deportation, is directly reviewable in the court of appeals 
or must go by the old route of the district court. Is such a refusal 
a "final order of deportation"? Five of the nine judges of the 
Second Circuit said it is not.92 A minority accepted the Govern-
same effect is Division of Prod., Am. Petroleum Institute v. Halaby, 307 F.2d 363 (5th 
Cir. 1962). 
80 64 Stat. 1129 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1031·42 (1958). 
87 236 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956). 
as Id. at 791. 
89 Ibid. 
oo Id. at 793. 
01 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (Supp. III, 1961). 
82 Foti v. Immigration &: Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1962); accord, 
Holtz v. Immigration &: Naturalization Serv., 309 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1962). Contra, Blagaic 
v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962). 
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ment's argument that Congress had, in the words of a committee 
report, intended " 'to create a single, separate, statutory form of 
judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and 
exclusion of aliens.' "93 But the majority was unable to see its 
way clear to holding that a refusal to suspend deportation was an 
order to deport. It saw procedural problems in the lack of a record 
that would contain everything relevant to a review; and it noted 
that not even under the statutory scheme were all questions in-
volved in such proceedings reviewable by the court of appeals. 
This situation illustrates that in drafting review sections there 
should be a check list of the various possible administrative actions 
and a decision made as to where each type is to be reviewed. In the 
absence of such an effort, my own disposition would be that of 
the minority. I would strive to the greatest extent possible to con-
solidate review in a single court. There might be some awkward-
ness: the occasional lack of a record. But this is rare, arid when it 
arises it can ordinarily be taken care of by affidavits or by a refer-
ence to a master or to the agency itself. It does seem to be the 
solution that is currently emerging by statute or decision. 
There are, however, statutes which define a reviewable order 
with such limiting circumstantiality that a number of determina-
tive agency actions cannot possibly be squared with the require-
ments. The National Labor Relations Act is such a statute. 
Experience prior to the adoption of the act led to a restrictive 
review provision. The work of the Board can be classified roughly 
into proceedings to certify collective bargaining representatives 
and proceedings to adjudicate unfair labor practices. The review 
statute is restricted to "final orders" in the unfair labor practice 
cases. In Leedom v. Kyne94 the Supreme Court decided that cer-
tain actions taken in representation proceedings were reviewable; 
review in such cases would be under the original jurisdiction of 
the district courts in proceedings "arising under any Act of Con-
gress regulating commerce. . . ."95 And there have been a few 
cases arising out of unfair labor practice proceedings where, de-
spite the absence of a final order, review has been allowed by an 
93 Quoted in Foti v. Immigration &: Naturalization Serv., supra note 92, at 783 
(majority opinion). 
94 358 U.S. 184 (1958), applied in Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 
300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962), afj'd sub nom. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros 
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
95 28 u.s.c. § 1337 (1958). 
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original action in the district court. The most interesting of these 
is Deering Milliken, Inc. v. ]ohnston,96 enforcing the provision of 
the AP A that every agency "shall proceed with reasonable dis-
patch. "97 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An administrative action may be ripe for review despite the 
fact that the full impact of the action on the plaintiff may be de-
layed or the fact that the disputed legal issue could receive further 
consideration at a later stage of the same or a related proceeding. 
Presumptively, in such circumstances it should not be reviewed. 
Review is likely to interrupt and prolong the administrative pro-
ceeding. The administrative action may not yet have received as 
full consideration as it will later receive, and a reviewing court 
will thus lack some of the material for judgment. The relation 
between the action and the plaintiff's position may not have been 
brought into focus, so that the disputed legal issue may be more 
"abstract" than it need be. As a consequence the question may not 
be well-suited to judicial consideration. And finally, if the plain-
tiff were to wait, sanctions might not be invoked against him or 
he may eventually win the administrative proceeding itself; thus, 
the court will have been relieved of the burden of unnecessary 
decision-making. On the other hand, delay may work a substantial 
sacrifice of the plaintiff's protected interests, and it is this potential 
loss which should be weighed against the factors supporting the 
requirement of formal finality. For it should be remembered that 
every one of these factors is one of degree. Early review may in 
some cases be just as (or nearly as) administratively expedient, 
just as informed, just as well-tailored for judicial consideration 
as review at a more orthodox terminal point. Remember, too, 
that it is characteristic of many administrative situations that they 
are in flux. They may not present the full stops of ordinary civil 
litigation; the doctrines of finality drawn from the common law 
96 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). See the excellent treatment of the Deering Milliken 
case in 72 YALE L.J. 574 (1963). Cf. Local II2, Int'l Union Allied Industrial Workers v. 
Rothman, 209 F. Supp. 295 (D.D.C. 1962), ordering that the Board hear an interested 
party before entering into a settlement. The Court in Deering Milliken rested its 
jurisdiction on the APA § I0(e), rather than on Title 28, § 1337 of the Judicial Code. 
As Judge Friendly suggests in Empresa, this enables a district court to avoid the juris-
dictional limitations applicable to § 1331 of the Judicial Code. Empresa Hondurena de 
Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 227 n.5 (2d Cir. 1962), afj'd sub nom. McCulloch 
v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
97 Section 6(a), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958). 
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may not only be inapplicable but even alien to the needs of the 
administrative process. Where, for example, administrative regula-
tion is concerned with creating the basic structure of an industry, 
early review may have positive advantages. In any case-to repeat 
-each of these factors is one of degree, as is true also of plaintiff's 
hardship. This argues for a flexible approach. It argues for the 
approach suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, which I shall once 
more quote: "Whether 'justiciability' exists ... has most often 
turned on evaluating both the appropriateness of the issues for 
decision by courts and the hardship of denying judicial relief."9s 
98 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951). 
